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references that go towards pluralism, let me throw in three other volumes (Levy and 
Peart,  2005 ; Caplan and Schotter,  2008 ; Banerjee and Dufl o,  2012 ) as a way towards 
“interaction, debate, openness and tolerance of others” (p. 579). 
 M.  Ali Khan 
 The Johns Hopkins University 
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 Till D ű ppe’s  The Making of the Economy is, to my knowledge, the only attempt to seri-
ously apply Edmund Husserl’s interwar phenomenological thinking to economics and its 
history. The book is highly original, thought-provoking, and rich in its survey of the entire 
history of economics. Husserl’s complaint against modern science (1970) is that it ‘forgets’ 
our immediate, pre-given ‘life-world’ ( Lebenswelt-vergessenheit ), and creates an abstract, 
false world of objects and facts it investigates in an abstract (indeed, alienated  1  ) way. 
‘Scientifi cation’ is an ‘objectifi cation’; ‘nature’ is constructed; science is a history of accu-
mulating facts ( Tatsachengeschicte ) whose justifi cation is a hollow, scientifi c, realist pro-
gressivism. Husserl and phenomenology are Continental philosophy’s answer to logical 
positivism and the whole twentieth-century philosophy of science tradition derived from 
that starting point—which, it is worth noting, has also long been the way that the history of 
economic methodology has been seen, or at least until the disjuncture caused by the rise of 
the sociology of scientifi c knowledge and social constructivist thinking, as infl uenced by 
people such as Steven Shapin. Thus, one defi nite service D ű ppe provides is to encourage 
us to take an unfamiliar and, in many respects, deeper philosophical look at how we 
understand the evolution of the history of economics. 
 His title gives us economics’ particular form of scientifi c objectifi cation: the economy 
itself is something made. “The economy—one may quote me on this  2  —has never shown 
 
1
 Husserl thus follows in a long history of dialectical reasoning in terms of the alienation concept dating 
back to Hegel. 
 
2
 Okay, I will. 
BOOK REVIEWS 129
itself, even if the government were on holiday” (p. 119). In this, he shares with Margaret 
Schabas ( 2006 ) the view that ‘scientifi cation’ in economics is associated with a denatu-
ralization of economic life. The lived ‘natural’ world, the  Lebenswelt , is a matter of human 
concern prior to seventeenth-century British mercantilist economics, but after this 
time—here, D ű ppe especially follows William Letwin ( 1963 )—the emergence of trade 
and the disturbing manifestation of private interest drove a new liberal political economy 
discourse, ultimately the science of wealth (J. S. Mill), whose crowning achievement 
was to successfully dispel, at least temporarily, a ‘culture of suspicion’ surrounding the 
new science over whether the world of the economy commonly worked to one’s 
disadvantage. 
 Indeed, suspicion, the shadow of the suppressed and forgotten  Lebenswelt , the 
vague sense that economics misrepresents the world, is the principal theme in D ű ppe’s 
argument. This is the meaning of the painting on the book’s cover— Ein Notar (1542) 
by Marinus van Reymerswaele—which shows a seemingly inconspicuous clerk in the 
center of the picture recording an unhappy transaction between a money lender and a 
poor debtor. The clerk’s  persona is the one sought by the future economist, who seeks 
the virtue of ‘blind sight’ (Daston and Galison  2007 ) associated with the anonymity of 
a scientist concerned only with how ‘objective’ forces operate in the ‘economy.’ Yet, 
suspicion persists, and so, for D ű ppe, the evolving history of economics is built around 
constructing an increasingly abstract structure lying beyond human interests and 
removed from the world we experientially occupy. Here, then, it is Michel Foucault 
who matters for D ű ppe, because Foucault sees the development of science as insepa-
rable from the development of authority. Economics, then, does more than simply 
objectify; it governs and rules our perception of the  Lebenswelt . 
 A few words about D ű ppe’s periodization of the history of economics: the ‘fi rst wave of 
scientifi cation of economic writings,’ liberal political economy, lasts until the 1840s, when 
J. S. Mill and Karl Marx confront industrialization. The second wave, ‘high modernism,’ 
lasts from then until 1945. These two waves are described with much historical knowledge 
and insight, but it is the third wave, the ‘formalist revolution’ (with its seed in the socialist 
calculation debate), and the symbolic fi gure of Gerhard Debreu, that is of special interest 
for current debates over the nature of economics (also cf. D ű ppe  2012 ). What future might 
economics then expect, having reached a pinnacle of abstraction? Here, D ű ppe’s verdict is 
not unremittingly pessimistic, but he also gives little reason for optimism. Might economics 
thus be at the end of its alienated ‘life-cycle’? I won’t tell you how the story ends (indeed, 
it cannot), but simply note that, for D ű ppe, economics can only press the forgetting of 
the  Lebenswelt , never eliminate it as its basis. 
 A couple of issues: fi rst, one criticism might be made of D ű ppe’s phenomenological 
argument. The central claim of the book is that economics has redirected and con-
trolled our perception and thereby suppressed the  Lebenswelt , the lived natural world 
of which we are part. But one could ask: why isn’t the objectifi ed world our real 
 Lebenswelt ? And why shouldn’t our own  Lebenswelt be different from that which we 
imagine occupied the pre-modern world? Second, why not include phenomenologist 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in this account? 
 However, whatever one’s view is of D ű ppe’s overall arguments, he is surely to be 
commended for his impressive knowledge of the history of economics, which exceeds 
that of not a few more senior scholars. And his writing a whole history also prompts 
us to ask: where are the ambitious histories of economics among the publications of 
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historians of economics today? Indeed, who any longer debates the major interpretations 
of the history of economics in our contemporary small-scale culture of journal publica-
tion? Do historians today even recognize that historiographic form that once made an 
issue of how the history of economics is to be interpreted, such as occupied such 
great historians as Edwin Cannan, Erich Roll, Henry William Spiegel, Warren Samuels, 
and so many others of two generations past? 
 John B.  Davis 
 Marquette University and University of Amsterdam 
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 The diverse studies collected in  The Empire of Credit , ranging over both monetary and 
fi nancial history and the history of monetary theory, share a common theme: the inter-
action between the fi scal requirements of national defense and the rapid evolution of 
monetary and fi nancial institutions from the late seventeenth century to the early nine-
teenth century, the period in which Great Britain unexpectedly displaced France as the 
chief European military power, while gaining a far-fl ung intercontinental empire, only 
modestly diminished by the loss of thirteen American colonies in 1783. What enabled 
that interaction to produce such startling results were economies achieved by substituting 
bank-supplied money (banknotes and, increasingly, bank deposits) for gold and silver. 
The world leader in the creation of these new instruments, Britain reaped the benefi ts 
of reduced transactions costs while simultaneously creating a revenue source (through 
the establishment of the Bank of England) that could be tapped by the Crown and 
Parliament to fund the British military, thereby enabling conquests against rivals 
(especially France) that lagged behind Britain in the development of fl exible monetary 
institutions. 
 Though fl exible, British monetary arrangements were based on a commitment to a 
fi xed value of sterling in terms of gold, a commitment that avoided both the disastrous 
consequences of John Law’s brilliant, but ill-fated, monetary schemes in France, and 
